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Forbidden City Enclosed by the Great 
Firewall: The Law and Power of Internet 
Filtering in China 
Jyh-An Lee* 
Ching-Yi Liu** 
China’s Internet filtering and censorship regime has re-
ceived considerable global attention. The Chinese government 
has successfully regulated access to Internet content at the na-
tional level through technical means. Although some research-
ers optimistically viewed the Internet as a liberating force in 
China’s democratic development, the Chinese government has 
actually been using network technologies to control online in-
formation and grafting its own ideology to the Net. Digital 
technologies have become the government’s tool to tamp down 
political threats. The rise of the Chinese model of Internet con-
trol prompts many interesting questions associated with Inter-
net law scholarship. This Article uses Lawrence Lessig’s pro-
nouncement “code is law” as a lens for understanding the 
Internet filtering system in China. Through the application of 
Lessig’s theory to the great firewall of China, we aim to illus-
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trate the theory’s new implications and the government’s policy 
options in cyberspace. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Inspired by the successful Tunisian revolt in the spring of 
2011, anonymous activists quickly emerged on the Internet 
calling for a “jasmine revolution” in China.1 Completely intol-
erant of this radical appeal, Beijing orchestrated massive cen-
sorship of the Internet and phone services within the country in 
an attempt to prevent protesters from organizing demonstra-
tions online.2 The phrase “jasmine revolution” was filtered and 
could no longer be seen or searched for by Chinese end users.3 
This is just one of the numerous examples of how the Chinese 
government controlled citizens’ behavior and online infor-
mation via Internet filtering. In an environment where infor-
mation flows pervasively, the most effective and efficient tool 
for government control is probably neither strict law nor mili-
tary force, but technology itself. 
There is no doubt that the Internet has unleashed vast in-
formation flows throughout global society. In the book The 
World Is Flat, Thomas Friedman notes that anyone with an In-
ternet connection has the ability to find almost any information 
on the web.4 A number of commentators have also asserted that 
the Internet enables a free flow of information and helps create 
a freer society.5 This assertion has been true for some, but not 
all, countries in the world.6 In China, the government has built 
                                                          
 1. See, e.g., Andrew Jacobs & Jonathan Ansfield, Catching Scent of Revo-
lution, China Moves to Snip Jasmine, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2011, at A1; Austin 
Ramzy, State Stamps Out Small “Jasmine” Protests in China, TIME, Feb. 21, 
2011, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2052860,00.html. 
 2. Andrew Jacobs, Chinese Government Responds to Call for Protests, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2011, at A8; Ramzy, supra note 1. 
 3. Jacobs & Ansfield, supra note 1, at A1; Jacobs, supra note 2, at A8. 
 4. See THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS FLAT: A BRIEF HISTORY OF 
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 75–77 (2007). 
 5. Ronald J. Deibert, Dark Guests and Great Firewalls: The Internet and 
Chinese Security Policy, 58 J. SOC. ISSUES 143, 143 (2002); Christopher Ste-
venson, Breaching the Great Firewall: China’s Internet Censorship and the 
Quest for Freedom of Expression in a Connected World, 30 B. C. INT’L & COMP. 
L. REV. 531, 533–34 (2007). 
 6. Stevenson, supra note 5, at 534; see also Deibert, supra note 5, at 143 
(“China . . . is a ‘hard case’ for those who argue that the Internet cannot be 
controlled”); Kristen Farrell, The Big Mamas Are Watching: China’s Censor-
ship of the Internet and the Strain on Freedom of Expression, 15 MICH. ST. J. 
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perhaps the world’s most sophisticated Internet filtering sys-
tem to block numerous foreign and domestic websites, which 
are viewed by the government as a threat to the Chinese state.7 
The blocked websites tend to be those containing information 
associated with Tibetan Independence, Taiwan Independence, 
human rights, Falun Gong, and other perceived threats to the 
Communist Party.8 The government argues that such censor-
ship practices are desirable, as they can prevent the Western 
world from “dumping” information on China. Maintaining so-
cial stability has become one of the most important goals of In-
ternet filtering in China.9 There should thus be little surprise 
when, in a public talk, Hu Jintao declared, “[w]hether [the gov-
ernment] can cope with the Internet is a matter that affects the 
development of socialist culture, the security of information, 
and the stability of the state.”10 
When the Internet was first introduced to China, some re-
searchers optimistically viewed it as a liberating force in Chi-
na’s democratic development.11 Researchers assumed that the 
free flow of information fostered by the Internet would ineluc-
                                                          
INT’L L. 577, 590 (2007) (“The Internet has increasingly become a tool for secu-
rity agencies to identify, monitor, arrest and imprison potential dissidents.”). 
 7. See, e.g., OPENNET INITIATIVE (ONI), China, in ACCESS CONTROLLED 
449, 449 (Ronald Deibert et al., 2010) [hereinafter ONI CHINA]; Stevenson, su-
pra note 5, at 536–37; Lijun Tang & Peidong Yang, Symbolic Power and the 
Internet: The Power of a “Horse,” 33 MEDIA, CULTURE & SOC’Y 675, 678 (2011). 
See also YUEZHI ZHAO, COMMUNICATION IN CHINA: POLITICAL, ECONOMY, 
POWER, AND CONFLICT 32 (2008) (“With the increasing sophistication of fire-
walls and filtering software, the survival time for offensive content in cyber-
space has been progressively reduced.”). 
 8. See, e.g., Robert Faris & Nart Villeneuve, Measuring Global Internet 
Filtering, in ACCESS DENIED: THE PRACTICE AND POLICY OF GLOBAL INTERNET 
FILTERING 5, 9, 12 (Ronald Deibert et al. eds., 2008); Stevenson, supra note 5, 
at 541; see also Farrell, supra note 6, at 587–88 (“China considers a wide range 
of topics sensitive and controversial . . . [I]ncluding the Tiananmen Square up-
rising, support for a free Tibet, the Falun Gong spiritual movement, criticism 
of China’s human rights and social justice records, independent news media, 
and pro-democracy/pro-Western commentary.”). 
 9. See ONI CHINA, supra note 7, at 456–67. 
 10. Xiao Qiang, The Rise of Online Public Opinion and Its Political Im-
pact, in CHANGING MEDIA, CHANGING CHINA 202, 207–08 (Susan L. Shirk ed., 
2011). For a different version of the English translation of this talk, see James 
F. Scotton, The Impact of New Media, in NEW MEDIA FOR A NEW CHINA 28, 41 
(James F. Scotton & William A. Hachten eds., 2010). 
 11. See, e.g., Yutian Ling, Upholding Free Speech and Privacy Online: A 
Legal-based and Market-based Approach for Internet Companies in China, 27 
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 175, 215 (2011). 
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tably lead to a free society.12 Nonetheless, the Chinese govern-
ment has actually been using network technologies to control 
online information and grafting its own ideology to the Net. 
Such control has never been loosened, even during the 2008 
Beijing Olympics.13 Digital technologies have become a power-
ful tool with which the government tamps down political 
threats.14 The Chinese government has ordered Chinese Inter-
net carriers, like China Telecom, to deploy Cisco’s equipment 
with the goal of blocking unwanted materials’ entrance into 
China.15 This practice has significantly changed the open na-
ture of the Internet. Some researchers indicate that the Inter-
net filtering in China “has become a paradigm of Internet cen-
sorship” for global society.16 
The Chinese government has attempted to control online 
content via several different targets, including Internet content 
providers, individual consumers, and content on foreign web-
sites.17 Nonetheless, this Article focuses on the technological 
filtering mechanism that prevents Chinese Internet users from 
accessing unwanted online content. Lawrence Lessig’s pro-
nouncement “code is law” is particularly useful to our examina-
tion.18 We use this idea as a lens through which to better un-
derstand the Internet filtering system in China. The essential 
characteristic of code-as-regulator is that “[a] rule is defined, 
not through a statute, but through the code that governs.”19 
                                                          
 12. See, e.g., SHANTHI KALATHIL & TAYLOR C. BOAS, OPEN NETWORKS, 
CLOSED REGIMES: THE IMPACT OF THE INTERNET ON AUTHORITARIAN RULE 1–
2 (2003); Stevenson, supra note 5, at 533–34. 
 13. ONI CHINA, supra note 7, at 468. 
 14. It is not easy to illustrate the relationships between the Internet and 
democracy because there are a number of complicated human experiences, in-
stitutions, and other factors in between. See GUOBIN YANG, THE POWER OF 
THE INTERNET IN CHINA 10 (2009). 
 15. See, e.g., Derek E. Bambauer, Cybersieves, 59 DUKE L.J. 377, 379 
(2009); Stevenson, supra note 5, at 542. 
 16. Ronald Deibert & Rafal Rohozinski, Beyond Denial: Introducing Next-
generation Information Access Controls, in ACCESS CONTROLLED, supra note 7, 
at 3, 4. 
 17. See, e.g., Gudrun Wacker, The Internet and Censorship in China, in 
CHINA AND THE INTERNET: POLITICS OF THE DIGITAL LEAP FORWARD 58, 69–70 
(Christopher R. Hughes & Gudrun Wacker eds., 2003); Yang, supra note 14, at 
48. 
 18. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE VERSION 2.0, 5 (2d ed. 2006) [hereinafter 
CODE VERSION 2.0]. 
 19. Id. at 24. 
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The theory is that technology can fulfill a regulatory function or 
at least have the same effects as regulation does.20 The Chinese 
case of Internet filtering elucidates the fact that although the 
government may choose to use the law to regulate people’s 
online behavior, controlling access to online information via 
technical architecture seems to be a much more effective ap-
proach. By applying Lessig’s theory to the great firewall of Chi-
na, we intend here to illustrate both some important novel im-
plications of the theory and the Chinese government’s policy 
options in cyberspace. Indeed, the Internet filtering practices in 
China have drawn considerable criticism, especially from the 
perspectives of democratic development and the value of an 
open Internet.21 Nevertheless, the aim of our article is neither 
to evaluate the Chinese Internet filtering system nor to argue 
that technology can entirely replace the law. What we attempt 
to illustrate is how a government can shape human behavior 
via architecture design and the inimitable role played by code-
based regulations in law enforcement. 
II. INTERNET FILTERING IN CHINA 
 
In China, information and communications technologies 
(ICTs), including the Internet, have been growing rapidly be-
cause of strong support from the government in recent years.22 
The Internet infrastructure in China has experienced extraor-
dinary growth in terms of scale, technology, and quality.23 The 
number of Internet users and its rate of growth have surpassed 
                                                          
 20. Id. 
 21. See Robert Mackey, Obama Walks China’s “Great Firewall,” N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 16, 2009), http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/11/16/obama-on-
chinas-great-firewall (quoting President Obama, “I am a big supporter of non-
censorship . . . in the United States, the fact that we have free Internet—or 
unrestricted Internet access—is a source of strength, and I think [it] should be 
encouraged.”). For other criticisms of Internet filtering, see William J. Cannici, 
Jr., The Global Online Freedom Act: A Critique of Its Objectives, Methods, and 
Ultimate Effectiveness Combating American Businesses That Facilitate Inter-
net Censorship in the People’s Republic of China, 32 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 123, 
147–54 (2007); Kevin Werbach, The Centripetal Network: How the Internet 
Holds Itself Together, and the Forces Tearing It Apart, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
343, 367 (2008). 
 22. See, e.g., Wacker, supra note 17, at 58. 
 23. See, e.g., Wei Wu, Great Leap or Long March: Some Policy Issues of the 
Development of the Internet in China, 20 TELECOMM. POL’Y 699, 699–701 
(1996); Jonathan J.H. Zhu & Enhai Wang, Diffusion, Use, and Effect of the In-
ternet in China, 48 COMM. ACM 49, 50–52 (2005). 
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those of any other country in the world.24 All the while, the 
Chinese government has endeavored to control the Internet’s 
flows of information through such approaches as regulations 
and technology applications. 
Early on in the widespread use of the Internet, filters were 
programs that, by manipulating routers, blocked data from en-
tering or leaving a network.25 The initial aim was to provide In-
ternet service providers (ISPs) with means to control viruses, 
worms, and spam.26 The same technology has been employed by 
the Chinese government to filter online information.27 This 
technology was harnessed by the Chinese government to pre-
vent Internet users from accessing “objectionable” Internet Pro-
tocol (IP) addresses.28 The government blocks online infor-
mation from citizens it deems too sensitive or inappropriate.29 
A great number of countries have developed their own Internet 
filtering systems because of political, moral, religious, or securi-
ty concerns.30 Traditionally, there have been two types of In-
ternet filtering techniques: the inclusion filter and the exclu-
sion filter.31 The inclusion filter typically uses a “white list” to 
include websites that are permitted for browsing, whereas the 
exclusion filter employs a “blacklist,” which specifies websites 
that users are prohibited from visiting.32 Countries blocking 
websites usually request ISPs to undertake a two-pronged ap-
proach in blocking.33 Countries begin with general IP blocking 
because it is the cheapest way to filter online information and 
switch to domain name service (DNS) blocking in response to 
complaints of over blocking.34 
                                                          
 24. ONI CHINA, supra note 7, at 453. 
 25. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, RACE TO THE BOTTOM: CORPORATE 
COMPLICITY IN CHINESE INTERNET CENSORSHIP 9–10 (2006). 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Marc D. Nawyn, Survey, Code Red: Responding to the Moral Hazards 
Facing U.S. Information Technology Companies in China, 2007 COLUM. BUS. 
L. REV. 505, 510–13 (2007). 
 29. Jonathan Zittrain & John Palfrey, Introduction, in ACCESS DENIED: 
THE PRACTICE AND POLICY OF GLOBAL INTERNET FILTERING, supra note 8. 
 30. See id. at 3; Faris & Villeneuve, supra note 8, at 7, 9. 
 31. Nawyn, supra note 28, at 510. 
 32. Id.; Ling, supra note 11, at 184; Jennifer Shyu, Comment, Speak No 
Evil: Circumventing Chinese Censorship, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 211, 227 
(2008). 
 33. Faris & Villeneuve, supra note 8, at 13–14. 
 34. Id. at 14. 
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The Chinese government has adopted the exclusion filter 
by requesting carriers, such as China Telecom, to install Cisco’s 
apparatus, which can drop information from at least three 
hundred IP addresses.35 The Chinese government provided the 
carriers with a list of forbidden websites and their addresses, 
and ordered these carriers to block the sites through Cisco’s 
equipment.36 Among these sites are those of Amnesty Interna-
tional, Reporters without Borders, the BBC, the Economist, and 
the New York Times.37 In this way, certain information has 
been dropped from the Internet, never reaching many of Chi-
na’s domestic end users. 
From the Chinese government’s perspective, the inclusion 
filter usually includes too few websites, as new websites con-
tinuously emerge and pose new threats; likewise, the exclusion 
filter may exclude too few.38 In order to avoid such under-
inclusion and under-blocking, governments have started to ex-
ercise the “content-analysis” technique as a new approach to 
Internet filtering.39 The content-analysis technique prevents 
users from accessing any website or URL path containing cer-
tain keywords designated by the government.40 One advantage 
to a government’s adoption of the content-analysis technique is 
that the censors do not have to incessantly update a white list 
or blacklist. In China, keywords for content analysis include 
“Tibetan independence,” “Taiwan independence,” “human 
rights,” and “Falun Gong.”41 The scope of filtering is continu-
ously increasing and is far beyond the “three Ts: Tibet, 
Tiananmen, and Taiwan.”42 
The Chinese government has built a complicated techno-
logical system and has integrated it into the Internet to filter 
                                                          
 35. Id. 
 36. JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET: 
ILLUSIONS OF A BORDERLESS WORLD 93–94 (2006). 
 37. ANDREW MURRAY, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY LAW 74 (2010); 
Deibert, supra note 5, at 147; Farrell, supra note 6, at 588. 
 38. Nawyn, supra note 28, at 510–11. 
 39. Id. at 511. 
 40. Id.; Susan L. Shirk, Changing Media, Changing China, in CHANGING 
MEDIA, CHANGING CHINA, supra note 10, at 1, 14; Cannici, supra note 21, at 
131; Faris & Villeneuve, supra note 8, at 15; Ling, supra note 11, at 185; Shyu, 
supra note 32, at 227; Andrew W. Lloyd, Note, Increasing Global Demand for 
an Uncensored Internet—How the U.S. Can Help Defeat Online Censorship by 
Facilitating Private Action, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 299, 303 (2008). 
 41. See GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 36, at 96; Stevenson, supra note 5, 
at 541. 
 42. ONI CHINA, supra note 7, at 471. 
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online information, a process that has been ongoing since the 
digital network was built.43 Through the help of an end user 
living in China, Jonathan Zittrain and Ben Eldman produced a 
list in 2002 identifying foreign websites blocked by the Chinese 
government.44 The Chinese government had deemed the sites a 
threat to the Chinese state.45 As we mentioned, China is obvi-
ously not the only country that filters out politically sensitive 
content. Other countries with similar motives include Bahrain, 
Ethiopia, Libya, Iran, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Thai-
land, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Syria, Tunisia, Uz-
bekistan, and Vietnam.46 For different purposes such as block-
ing pornography, some democratic countries, including 
Australia, Britain, Canada, France, Japan, and New Zealand, 
filter online content as well.47 
How is it that the Chinese government developed and im-
plemented a complex system for controlling the flow of infor-
mation into the country? In fact, the government built a great 
firewall with direct assistance from the U.S. hardware vendor 
Cisco.48 This assistance made it possible for the whole country’s 
Internet to evolve into a huge intranet.49 It is estimated that 
the company earns USD $500 million each year in China for 
services rendered.50 Other companies that provide filtering 
software to China include Sun Microsystems (acquired by Ora-
cle in 2010), Websense, and Bay Networks, all of which are U.S. 
companies.51 The filter has been constructed on different layers 
                                                          
 43. Nawyn, supra note 28, at 512; Stevenson, supra note 5, at 540. 
 44. Jonathan Zittrain & Benjamin Edelman, Internet Filtering in China, 7 
IEEE INTERNET COMPUTING 70 (2003). 
 45. See Nawyn, supra note 28, at 519–20. 
 46. Bambauer, supra note 15, at 382; Faris & Villeneuve, supra note 8, at 
9–10; Shaojung Sharon Wang & Junhao Hong, Discourse Behind the Forbid-
den Realm: Internet Surveillance and Its Implications on China’s Blogosphere, 
27 TELEMATICS & INFORMATICS 67, 74 (2010). 
 47. Bambauer, supra note 15 at 382; Derek E. Bambauer, Filtering in Oz: 
Australia’s Foray into Internet Censorship, 31 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 493, 516–17 
(2009) [hereinafter Filtering in Oz]. 
 48. See, e.g., GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 36, at 93; Lloyd, supra note 40, 
at 312; Cannici, supra note 21, at 132; Stevenson, supra note 5, at 541–42. 
 49. Deibert, supra note 5, at 147; Stevenson, supra note 5, at 540–41. 
 50. Stevenson, supra note 5, at 542. 
 51. Id; Deibert, supra note 5, at 148; see also Farrell, supra note 6, at 587 
(“American engineers aided the Chinese in censorship by developing special 
routers, integrators, and special firewall boxes”); Wacker, supra note 17, at 69 
(“It is ironic, therefore, that while the Western media frequently criticise Chi-
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of China’s Internet, but it has been constructed primarily at the 
“backbone level of China’s network,” the physical infrastructure 
that links the domestic Internet to global networks.52 
The metaphor most frequently used in describing the In-
ternet filtering in China is “the great firewall,” an obvious play 
on the words ‘the Great Wall’ and ‘firewall.’53 The Great Wall of 
China was built by the ancient Chinese state to keep foreign 
invaders at bay; in an analogous way, the great firewall de-
notes China’s attempt to block undesirable content from its 
“netizens.” Different from the firewalls established to protect 
enterprises’ information systems, the great firewall of China, as 
it were, forms a virtual ring around an entire country.54 Au-
thorized to build the firewall, the country’s Ministry of Infor-
mation Industry (MII) has had an extraordinary opportunity to 
ensure government control over China’s overall Internet net-
work.55 Because online information enters the country through 
a limited number of connection points, the Chinese government 
can control the information by controlling these connection 
points.56 Government control over information flow takes place 
via several Internet access providers (IAPs), “each of which has 
                                                          
na for obstructing the development of the Internet, it is Western firms that are 
supplying the technological means which enable China to carry out surveil-
lance.”). Some literature focuses on the legality of those U.S. companies’ sup-
port of the Chinese filtering regime, especially on whether the companies are 
in violation of the Global Online Freedom Act of 2006. See, e.g., Cannici, supra 
note 21, at 134–47; Ling, supra note 11, at 192–94; Nawyn, supra note 28, at 
544–554; Shyu, supra note 32, at 230–31; Stevenson, supra note 5, at 545–58. 
In the meantime, human-rights supporters have publicly criticized Cisco’s in-
volvement with the Chinese filtering regime. See, e.g., Tell Cisco: Stop Helping 
China Abuse Human Rights!, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., 
https://secure.eff.org/site/Advocacy?cmd=display&page=UserAction&id=504 
(last visited Aug. 10, 2011). 
 52. See Farrell, supra note 6, at 587; see also Nawyn, supra note 28, at 
511–12. 
 53. See, e.g., Ling, supra note 11, at 177, 180, 184; ONI CHINA, supra note 
7, at 460; Scotton, supra note 10, at 30–32; Shyu, supra note, 32, at 227; Kath-
erine Tsai, How to Create International Law: The Case of Internet Freedom in 
China, 21 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 401, 415 (2011); Ethan Zuckerman, In-
termediary Censorship, in ACCESS CONTROLLED, supra note 7, at 71, 73; David 
Pierson, Great Firewall’s Fall Opens the Web to China Briefly; Outage of Strict 
Internet Controls Lasts Several Hours, WASH. POST, Jan. 5, 2010, at A9. 
 54. GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 36, at 92. 
 55. Farrell, supra note 6, at 585; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 25, 
at 9. 
 56. YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL 
PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 267 (2006); GOLDSMITH & 
WU, supra note 36, at 93. 
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at least one connection to a foreign Internet backbone.”57 “IAPs 
peer at three Internet exchange points (IXPs) run by the state. 
IAPs grant regional Internet service providers (ISPs) access to 
backbone connections”58 under the control of Chinese govern-
ment. Under this regime, individual Chinese end users pur-
chase Internet access from one of several thousand ISPs, and 
those ISPs are in effect retail sellers of Internet access provided 
wholesale by the small number of IAPs. Different from the de-
centralized Internet architecture in most countries around the 
world, most ISPs in China need to connect to the global net-
work through one of the four state-controlled companies operat-
ing the IAPs and IXPs.59 By effectively managing the IAPs and 
IXPs, the Chinese government can control information flowing 
into the country from abroad.60 
The Chinese government has thus crafted the nation’s In-
ternet into two layers.61 The lower layer is that part of the net-
work where ISPs provide Internet access to consumers, while 
the upper layer is another set of connections where the lower 
layer can connect to the networks outside the country.62 China 
has pioneered Internet filtering globally by building the na-
tional filtering system on the nation’s backbone.63 It has been 
reported that in the upper layer there are nine gateways con-
necting the nation’s Internet to the global Internet network.64 
By controlling a number of key connection points in the upper 
layer, the government can control online information flowing 
from abroad.65 Therefore, the filtering technologies are imple-
                                                          
 57. Internet Filtering in China: 2006–2007, OPENNET INITIATIVE, 
http://opennet.net/studies/china2007 (last visited Mar. 26, 2010); see also 
Deibert, supra note 5, at 147 (“Such funneled access provides the most im-
portant outer layer of control and the basis for ‘firewall’ technologies to be im-
plemented that ostensibly block controversial or politically undesirable Web 
sites.”); Faris & Villeneuve, supra note 8, at 14 (“[China’s] blocking is done at 
the international gateway level affecting all users of the network regardless of 
ISP.”). 
 58. OpenNet Initiative (ONI), Country Summaries, in ACCESS DENIED: 
THE PRACTICE AND POLICY OF GLOBAL INTERNET FILTERING, supra note 9, at 
235, 264–65. 
 59. Ling, supra note 11, at 184. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Stevenson, supra note 5, at 540. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Deibert & Rohozinski, supra note 16, at 4. 
 64. Qiang, supra note 10, at 207. 
 65. Id. at 206. 
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mented on both layers of the Chinese Internet, which means 
that prohibited keywords and URLs are programmed into both 
the lower layer of ISPs and the upper layer of gateways con-
trolled by the government.66 
III. CODE-IS-LAW IN THE CONTEXT OF INTERNET FILTERING 
This section applies the code-is-law theory to the Internet-
filtering scenario in China. We will first introduce the theory 
and then explore its implications in the context of China’s In-
ternet filtering. We believe that China’s Internet-filtering re-
gime and its underlying policy implications exemplify the code-
is-law theory quite well. By applying the theory to the subject 
matter, we can see from a policy perspective how code-based 
regulation is different from the law and how technological ar-
chitecture regulates human behavior subtly. 
A. CODE-IS-LAW THEORY 
The code-is-law theory is most notably illustrated by Pro-
fessor Lawrence Lessig, who has argued that code—software or 
hardware—can perform regulatory functions and can have the 
same effects as legal regulation.67 The architecture of the In-
ternet, including the languages and protocols underlying soft-
ware and hardware, has determined how messages are moved 
from one place to another and how people perceive them.68 
Therefore, whether and how the Internet is regulated depends 
primarily on its architecture of code.69 The code is law in the 
sense that it constrains what you may or may not do in cyber-
space.70 It enables certain activities while disabling others.71 
Lessig believes that the “code” which controls the Internet ef-
fectively creates the Internet’s architecture and its “laws.”72 In 
a place like cyberspace, sometimes it is the code—not the law—
that has the greatest impact on human behavior.73 In Lessig’s 
words, “A rule is defined, not through a statute, but through 
the code that governs the space.”74 According to him, 
                                                          
 66. See Deibert & Rohozinski, supra note 16, at 4. 
 67. CODE VERSION 2.0, supra note 18, at 5. 
 68. See id. 
 69. Id. at 24. 
 70. See id. at 6. 
 71. Id. at 6. 
 72. Id. at 5–6. 
 73. Id. at 124. 
 74. Id. at 24. 
4 LEE LIU FINAL_JAD (DO NOT DELETE) 2/27/2012 1:25 PM 
136 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 13:1 
 
 
The software and hardware that make cyberspace what it is consti-
tute a set of constraints on how you can behave . . . . The code or soft-
ware or architecture or protocols set [certain] features, which are se-
lected by code writers. They constrain some behavior by making other 
behavior possible or impossible. The code embeds certain values or 
makes certain values impossible. In this sense, it too is regulation . . . 
. 75 
Lessig has observed that “[w]e can build, or architect, or 
code cyberspace to protect values that we believe are funda-
mental. Or we can build, or architect, or code cyberspace to al-
low those values to disappear.”76 From a policy perspective, 
Lessig has reminded policymakers to try to identify the means 
by which states can best advance their goals.77 Just as the 
code’s functionality defines the digital universe where people 
act, it also defines the range of regulatory options for policy-
makers.78 Although Lessig has explicitly acknowledged the 
fundamental differences between the law and code,79 some 
commentators have criticized his theory as a disingenuous rep-
resentation of the role of technologies in regulation.80 
B. THEORY APPLICATION 
It is possible that the Chinese government has built the 
most complicated Internet filtering architecture.81 It is an ar-
chitecture that has been crafted according to the preferences 
espoused in the state’s nationalist ideology.82 This is an exam-
ple of how the government can use the Internet’s architecture 
to enhance the ability to regulate the Internet. The Internet ar-
chitecture of China has significantly deviated from that of the 
                                                          
 75. Id. at 124–25. 
 76. Id. at 6 (emphasis omitted). 
 77. Id. at 129. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 5. 
 80. R. Polk Wagner, On Software Regulation, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 457, 460–
61 (2005). 
 81. See, e.g., Rebecca MacKinnon, Flatter World and Thicker Walls? Blogs, 
Censorship and Civil Discourse in China, 134 PUB. CHOICE 31, 32 (2008); THE 
OPEN NET INITIATIVE, INTERNET FILTERING IN CHINA IN 2004–2005, 4 (Apr. 
14, 2005), http://www.opennetinitiative.net/files/ONI_China_Country 
_Study.pdf (“China operates the most extensive, technologically sophisticated, 
and broad-reaching system of Internet filtering in the world.”); see also Far-
rell, supra note 6, at 577 (“Compared to other states, China’s censorship re-
gime is pervasive, sophisticated, and effective.”). 
 82. CODE VERSION 2.0, supra note 18, at 79–80. 
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Western world, which has been characterized by its openness 
and freedom.83 Comparing the differences of these two types of 
Internet architecture, it is not difficult to understand Lessig’s 
argument that “some architectures enable better control than 
others.”84 Chinese Internet filtering has provided an ideal ex-
ample for Lessig’s “code is law” theory. From the Chinese case, 
we can observe how code-based regulations function differently 
from law-based regulations. Although it is quite possible for 
policymakers to shape citizens’ behavior and achieve state 
goals through technological design, the success of technology- 
or code-enabled government control depends on other factors. 
In the case of Internet filtering, China’s exceptional censorship 
regime is attributable not only to the government’s determined 
control of online information flows and the government’s sub-
stantial investment in various technical measures, but also to 
the government’s early intervention in the network design. 
1. Law vs. Code as Regulation 
The “code is law” theory raises interesting questions re-
garding the role of code or architecture as an alternative to the 
law. Policymakers that have regulatory options between code 
and law take into account costs, benefits, and the impact asso-
ciated with each option.85 In China, the government has em-
ployed several mechanisms to regulate online information 
available to its citizens. Such mechanisms include laws, forcing 
search engines to censor and remove inappropriate content, in-
tensive cyber policing, and technologies that filter online con-
tent.86 
                                                          
 83. Stevenson, supra note 5, at 533–34. 
 84. CODE VERSION 2.0, supra note 18, at 24. 
 85. See, e.g., Jay P. Kesan & Rajiv C. Shah, Shaping Code, 18 HARV. J.L. 
& TECH. 319, 321–23 (2005). 
 86. CODE VERSION 2.0, supra note 18 at 80, 309; ONI CHINA, supra note 7, 
at 461; Shirk, supra note 40, at 14 (stating that “human monitors are paid to 
manually censor content proactively”); Cannici, supra note 21, at 130 (noting 
that there are 30,000 to 40,000 Internet police patrolling cyberspace in China); 
Lloyd, supra note 40, at 303; Scotton, supra note 10, at 29 (stating that an es-
timated 30,000 to 50,000 Internet monitors operate in China); Stevenson, su-
pra note 5, at 532, 540–44; Qiang, supra note 10, at 207–08 (“[H]uman moni-
tors are employed by both Web sites and the government to manually read and 
censor content.”); see ZHAO, supra note 7, at 20. According to Professor Yuezhi 
Zhao, a great number of “cyber police squads . . . are patrolling Chinese cyber-
space, deleting politically incorrect content in real time, blocking websites, 
monitoring networking activities of citizens, and tracking down and arresting 
offending individuals.” ZHAO, supra note 7, at 20. 
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It is usually more difficult for citizens to realize that they 
are regulated by code than by the law. Therefore, as Lessig 
points out, the uniqueness of code-based regulations is “how 
they are experienced.”87 When citizens are regulated by code, 
rather than the law, they will “experience these controls as na-
ture.”88 In circumstances where a Chinese end user never opens 
a forbidden website, the screen will not show “Blocked by the 
Chinese Government”: it will only show the signal of “site not 
found.”89 Some countries, such as Tunisia, Iran, the United Ar-
ab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia, use SmartFilter software, de-
veloped by the United States company Secure Computing, as a 
proxy filter. 90 The software provides “a blockpage that looks 
like the. . .browser’s default error page . . . .”91 Likewise, Uzbek-
istan’s Internet filtering hides the government’s blocking ef-
forts by redirecting users to Microsoft search engine 
www.live.com.92 The software used by China is similar to 
SmartFilter, but has been developed “in-country.”93 All of this 
software has helped China conceal the fact that blocking is tak-
ing place. An Internet user who is unable to open a webpage 
may not know at all whether this problem is because of gov-
ernment intervention or a purely technical problem.94 And in 
this way, code shapes and regulates human behavior more 
surely and subtly than the law. 
The invisibility of Internet filtering in China proves that 
Lessig’s concern over code-based regulation is not overstated. 
                                                          
 87. Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 
113 HARV. L. REV. 501, 509 (1999). 
 88. CODE VERSION 2.0, supra note 18, at 138. 
 89. GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 36, at 94; see also Bambauer, supra 
note 15, at 391 (noting that Internet users in China are not informed when 
they are prevented from reaching desired material, and instead, their Internet 
connections are reset). 
 90. Faris & Villeneuve, supra note 8, at 15; Stevenson, supra note 5, at 
542. 
 91. Faris & Villeneuve, supra note 8, at 15. 
 92. Id. at 16. 
 93. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 25, at 10; see also Wacker, supra 
note 17, at 69 (stating that Chinese companies have begun to supply the gov-
ernment with filtering software). See generally OPENNET INITIATIVE, 
INTERNET FILTERING IN TUNISIA IN 2005: A COUNTRY STUDY (2005), available 
at http://opennet.net/sites/opennet.net/files/ONI_Tunisia_Country_Study.pdf 
(describing how SmartFilter works). 
 94. GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 35, at 94; Bambauer, supra note 15, at 
391; Deibert & Rohozinski, supra note 16, at 4. 
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Lessig has warned that since regulation by code is not as 
transparent as regulation by the law, the former may weaken a 
society’s democratic value.95 Code-based regulation is different 
from law-based regulation because it enables the government 
to regulate human behavior in a secret way and hides its choic-
es or values behind the code.96 This is what is now happening 
in China. When accustomed to the inaccessibility of many web-
sites, citizens will be more likely to take such intervention and 
control (or technical problems, if that is the diagnosis) for 
granted. It is considerably more difficult to evaluate the justifi-
cations for and the true merits of Internet filtering than to ap-
ply those same types of evaluations to law-based regulation. 
Additionally, there is a relatively pronounced difficulty accom-
panying efforts to evaluate whether or not the original policy 
goals are realizable and remedies are available. 
The Chinese government has never disclosed its filters’ 
targets or its filtering systems’ criteria, and this practice has 
garnered significant controversy.97 According to the Chinese 
government, the purpose of filtering online information is to 
block “spiritual pollution” from foreign countries.98 Neverthe-
less, most commentators believe that the goal of the Chinese 
government’s Internet filtering and censorship is to minimize 
the discussions on sensitive political issues and to avoid the po-
tential organization of online anti-government voices.99 The ac-
countability issue associated with Internet filtering can be il-
lustrated in the controversy between the Chinese government 
and several human rights organizations on the strength and 
scope of China’s Internet filtering. Although the Chinese gov-
ernment asserts that it filters only websites disseminating in-
appropriate material (e.g., content promoting terrorism or other 
types of violence), the aforementioned organizations believe 
that the coverage of the online content being filtered is much 
wider than what the government claims.100 
Of course, governments implementing a filtering system 
can choose not to disguise the fact that they are blocking web-
sites. They may decide to declare what material they block in 
                                                          
 95. CODE VERSION 2.0, supra note 18, at 138; Lessig, supra note 87, at 
535, 541. 
 96. Lessig, supra note 87, at 541–42. 
 97. Bambauer, supra note 15, at 394; Shyu, supra note 32, at 227. 
 98. Deibert, supra note 5, at 147. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Tsai, supra note 53, at 406. 
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laws or public announcements.101 For example, Saudi Arabia 
has a government website explicitly disclosing the reasons for 
the state’s Internet filtering.102 Saudi Arabia using SmartFilter 
has decided to provide a blockpage notifying users that the re-
quested content has been blocked.103 The blockpage also in-
forms users how they can lift the block.104 However, Saudi Ara-
bia is one of the few countries willing to disclose blocking 
information and to provide a way around the block.105 The case 
of Saudi Arabia demonstrates that, when regulating by code, 
governments certainly have the option of whether to disclose 
their intent to censor information and to constrain behavior. 
Costs associated with different types of regulation can con-
stitute a crucial consideration for policymakers contemplating 
various regulatory options.106 Use of the law and use of code 
differ from each other regarding the monetary costs of imple-
menting and executing the given strategy.107 Law regulates be-
havior through an ex post approach.108 Law is not enforced un-
til a violation takes place.109 Although the threat of law 
enforcement applies to potential future violations, it may also 
incur significant costs for the regulator. From the perspective of 
the Chinese government, sending law-breakers—that is, people 
who have used the Internet to disseminate prohibited content—
to jail or imposing other punishments on them may draw con-
siderable negative attention internationally. The associated 
costs are extraordinarily high given China’s increasing im-
portance and visibility in the global community.110 In contrast, 
regulating by code is an ex ante approach with much fewer po-
litical costs.111 Although adopting the Internet-filtering tech-
niques may lead to certain criticisms regarding citizens’ right 
to information, the techniques’ costs are lower for the govern-
ment than would be law-based regulation. Moreover, the Chi-
                                                          
 101. Bambauer, supra note 15, at 394–95. 
 102. Id. at 390–91. 
 103. Faris & Villeneuve, supra note 8, at 15. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 16; Stevenson, supra note 5, at 536. 
 106. See CODE VERSION 2.0, supra note 18, at 310. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 124. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Lessig, supra note 87, at 541. 
 111. Id. 
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nese government could try to justify the practice by noting that 
many countries filter online content.112 
Sometimes code-based regulation needs to be implemented 
via laws and policies. For example, Singapore’s filtering system 
is implemented by law, which specifies the content filtered.113 
Nevertheless, when such laws and policies are announced, poli-
cymakers may experience considerable costs because this is an 
ex post approach, rather than a purely code-based regulatory 
approach. In May 2009, the Ministry of Information Technology 
initiated a project requiring that all computers made and sold 
in China be preinstalled with the filtering software Green Dam 
Youth Escort.114 However, this project was cancelled because of 
strong public protest.115 The filtering software was eventually 
required only for computers in schools and Internet cafes.116 
The Green Dam Escort initiative was actually an ex post meas-
ure that made citizens aware of the subject regulation, and 
thus, forewarned citizens could and did oppose the initiative be-
fore it went into effect. The government could not secretly in-
stall the filtering software on every computer without first 
somehow acquiring every private entity’s cooperation. In other 
words, to some extent the government needed to use the law for 
this mandate. In sum, Internet filtering at the gateway level or 
in the upper layer incurs much lower costs and is obviously 
more effective than the aborted Green Dam Escort initiative. 
2. Fulfilling Policy Goals via Architecture Design 
As a number of commentators have illustrated, the history 
of the Internet stands for freedom and openness.117 The original 
Internet architecture was designed as a distributed network 
without central control, and by its very design, the Internet is 
indeed quite difficult to control.118 The values underlying the 
original Internet design include at least interconnectivity, 
openness, flexibility, and the lack of a pervasive centralized au-
thority.119 Nonetheless, such attributes do not perfectly exist in 
                                                          
 112. Faris & Villeneuve, supra note 8, at 6, 13. 
 113. Bambauer, supra note 15, at 405. 
 114. ONI CHINA, supra note 7, at 472; Qiang, supra note 10, at 209. 
 115. Ling, supra note 11, at 184–85. 
 116. Id. at 185. 
 117. CODE VERSION 2.0, supra note 18, at 146. 
 118. See Shyu, supra note 32, at 215. 
 119. See, e.g., JOHN NAUGHTON, A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE FUTURE: FROM 
RADIO DAYS TO INTERNET YEARS IN A LIFETIME 275–77 (2000); Shyu, supra 
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the Chinese Internet architecture, as the Chinese government 
has been weaving nationalist ideology into the Internet itself. 
Similar to the practice of contemporary Chinese law, where the 
Chinese government monopolizes law enforcement virtually in 
all areas, the Chinese government has dominated the design 
and the construction of China’s Internet architecture since the 
inception of the Internet.120 Therefore, the Chinese government 
could rather successfully “architecture” its preferences into the 
Internet, making it significantly different from manifestations 
of the Internet in the Western world.121 In the case of Internet 
filtering, the Chinese government has understood that code, 
once it has evolved into law, becomes “a crucial focus of political 
contest.”122 
Another witnessing its establishment of a successful Inter-
net filtering system, Saudi Arabia created its own unique net-
work where Internet traffic flows through three “choke points” 
overseen by the Communications and Internet Technology 
Commission.123 Both China and Saudi Arabia designed central-
ized control points in the international gateways to their re-
spective Internet architectures when they were built in the 
mid-1990s. Therefore, the filtering systems have been imple-
mented at the international-gateway level regardless of the co-
operation or non-cooperation from ISPs.124 Such centralized 
control points have enabled the Chinese and Saudi Arabian 
governments to exercise control over information not only via-
bly but also effectively. Jonathan Zittrain explains the code-is-
law theory: “If regulators can induce certain alterations in the 
nature of Internet technologies that others could not undo or 
widely circumvent, then many of the regulatory limitations oc-
                                                          
note 32, at 215–16. 
 120. Nawyn, supra note 28, at 509, 513; Stevenson, supra note 5, at 540. 
 121. See YANG, supra note 14, at 44 (“[I]t is ultimately the government that 
has the power to decide what architecture to build and how regulatable the 
Internet remains.”). 
 122. DAVID G. POST, IN SEARCH OF JEFFERSON’S MOOSE: NOTES ON THE 
STATE OF CYBERSPACE 133 (2009) (quoting CODE VERSION 2.0, supra note 20.) 
 123. See Content Filtering in Saudi Arabia, General Information on Filter-
ing Service, COMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY COMMISSION 
OF SAUDI ARABIA, http://www.Internet.gov.sa/learn-the-web/guides/content-
filtering-in-saudi-arabia (last visited Apr. 1, 2010). 
 124. Faris & Villeneuve, supra note 8, at 14; see also Scotton, supra note 
10, at 31 (stating that the effectiveness of Internet filtering in China depends 
on “a small number of state controlled backbone networks.”). 
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casioned by the Internet would evaporate.”125 
Australia provides a good comparison with China and Sau-
di Arabia. The Australian government has attempted to build a 
filtering system into its existing Internet architecture.126 How-
ever, because the country’s Internet is as decentralized as its 
counterparts in other Western countries,127 the government has 
been unable to find a control point for deploying an effective fil-
tering system.128 The case of Australia reveals that the cost and 
the difficulty of implementing an Internet-filtering system are 
quite high if the government in question fails to take such a 
system into consideration when structuring the country’s In-
ternet architecture from the outset. Other countries that, like 
Iran, operate decentralized filtering regimes have found it diffi-
cult to maintain consistent results because filtering techniques 
differ from various ISPs.129 The difference between the Austral-
ian and the Chinese Internet-filtering systems illustrates how a 
government can determine the regulablility of the subject ar-
chitecture and how open architecture can constrain a govern-
ment’s power. As Lessig has pointed out: “[w]hether [the Net] 
can be regulated depends on its architecture. Some architec-
tures would be regulable, others would not. I have then argued 
that government could take a role in deciding whether an ar-
chitecture would be regulable or not.”130 Therefore, if the Inter-
net architecture has been crafted as an open and decentralized 
one since its inception, a government’s power to regulate the 
network would be reduced. In other words, an open architec-
ture represents a constraint on government power. This point 
echoes Lessig’s suggestion that the Internet’s architecture 
checks government control over both the Internet and the ideas 
it helps disseminate (or the values embedded in it).131 
Although a controlled and centralized Internet facilitates 
effective government regulation, it may erect hurdles to a lot of 
online innovations and business ventures. Therefore, tensions 
do exist between the two policy goals of effectively controlled 
                                                          
 125. JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET AND HOW TO 
STOP IT 105 (2008). 
 126. Filtering in Oz, supra note 47, at 508. 
 127. See, e.g., POST, supra note 122, at 86–87 (describing the decentralized 
nature of the Internet). 
 128. Filtering in Oz, supra note 47, at 509. 
 129. Faris & Villeneuve, supra note 8, at 16. 
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Internet-based flows of information and a flourishing economy. 
The Chinese government has attempted to create an Internet 
with positive externalities in business and economic develop-
ment, education, and information exchange.132 This attempt, 
ideally resting on the open nature of the Internet, conflicts with 
the state’s use of Internet-filtering and other regulatory Inter-
net-targeting controls.133 Consequently, achieving the two po-
tentially incompatible policy goals has become perhaps the 
most critical challenge faced by Chinese Internet policymakers. 
It seems that, so far, the Chinese government’s Internet policy 
has carefully maintained a tenable balance between openness 
and control. One commentator cited a 2005 People’s Daily edi-
torial to illustrate this viewpoint: 
As long as we use more ways of properly looking at the Internet, we 
can make use of the best parts, we go for the good and stay away from 
the bad and we use it for our purposes, then we can turn it around on 
them . . . . [W]e won’t be defeated in this huge Internet war by the 
various intranational and international reactionary ideological trends 
in the various areas. 134 
In sum, the Chinese government praises efforts to benefit 
from digital technology’s advantages, but declares that use of 
digital technology must not undermine state control.135 Main-
                                                          
 132. Deibert, supra note 5, at 147; MacKinnon, supra note 81, at 31. 
 133. See, e.g., Deibert, supra note 5, at 151 (“[There is a] long-term incom-
patibility of China’s restrictive Internet policies and its strong interest in pro-
moting information and communication technologies through trade, foreign 
direct investment, and industrial policy.”); Qiang, supra note 10, at 204 (“Since 
the introduction of the Internet in China, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
and Chinese government have shown ambivalence toward its effects as a new 
force in Chinese society.”). 
 134. MacKinnon, supra note 86, at 33 (citing G. Wu, The Popularization of 
the Internet in China and the Bankruptcy of the Prediction in the New York 
Times, PEOPLE’S DAILY, Nov. 30, 2005 http://www.zonaeuropa.com 
/20051130_1.htm). 
 135. See, e.g., Shubo Li, The Online Public Space and Popular Ethos in 
China, 32 MEDIA, CULTURE & SOC’Y 63, 71 (2010) (“Since 2003, the Hu Jin-tao 
administration has successfully dismantled the online political discussion 
space, while at the same time maintaining the stability of the online public 
mood.”); Shirk, supra note 40, at 13 (noting that the Chinese government em-
braces the Internet and invests more in controlling online content at the same 
time); Lokman Tsui, An Inadequate Metaphor: The Great Firewall and Chi-
nese Censorship, 9 GLOBAL DIALOGUE 60, 62 (2007) available at 
http://www.worlddialogue.org /print.php?id=400 (describing Beijing’s desire to 
simultaneously secure the Internet’s economic advantages and limit the Inter-
net’s political disadvantages); Wang & Hong, supra note 49, at 73 ( “The Chi-
nese government has found a compromise between its desire to control the In-
ternet and the need to become more competitive in the industry. . . . China’s 
4 LEE LIU FINAL_JAD (DO NOT DELETE) 2/27/2012 1:25 PM 
2012] FORBIDDEN CITY 145 
taining this balance is a core goal of China’s Internet policy, 
and goes far in explaining why, according to empirical evidence, 
the Internet promotes both freedom and control in China.136 
3. Architecture’s Impact on Human Behavior 
Governments have various options in shaping citizens’ be-
havior. A case in point: it has been reported that a great num-
ber of Internet police in China have been trying to shape public 
opinion by providing speeches favorable to the government.137 
Among other strategies, Internet filtering plays a crucial role in 
Chinese netizens’ behavior and can have an impact that is 
much greater than that of China’s Internet police.138 Some re-
searchers have argued that the goal of Internet filtering is “to 
shape citizens’ information environments and thereby alter be-
havior.”139 Judging from the direct and indirect evidence pre-
sented below, Internet filtering has affected Chinese netizens’ 
behavior in some intended and unintended ways. 
Most users trying to open a webpage that does not display 
would try to visit a substitute webpage rather than wait for the 
originally targeted webpage to show up on their screens.140 Us-
ers who are aware of the government filtering and censorship 
may still feel frustrated or angry when continuously being 
blocked from the content they wish to browse.141 Although so-
phisticated users can always circumvent the Internet-filtering 
technologies and reach the blocked foreign sites,142 there should 
be little doubt that the filtering system has effectively prevent-
ed most Chinese end users from accessing foreign websites 
deemed inappropriate by authorities.143 This is just one aspect 
of how architecture regulates behavior. However, one of the 
most profound consequences of this architecture is not that it 
immediately limits citizens’ access to sensitive foreign content, 
                                                          
model [is] a blend of economic openness and strict control over politics and dis-
sent. . . .”). 
 136. Lijun Tang & Peidong Yang, Symbolic Power and the Internet: The 
Power of a “Horse,” 33 MEDIA, CULTURE & SOC’Y at 675, 679 (2011); see also 
Tang & Yang, supra note 7, at 675, 679. 
 137. Cannici, supra note 21, at 130. 
 138. Id. at 131. 
 139. Bambauer, supra note 15, at 383. 
 140. See ZITTRAIN, supra note 125, at 105. 
 141. ONI CHINA, supra note 7, at 461; Bambauer, supra note 15, at 392. 
 142. Nawyn, supra note 28, at 514. 
 143. But see Zittrain, supra note 125, at 106 (optimistically and theoretical-
ly arguing that less savvy users could easily learn how to get around blocks). 
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but that it is gradually shaping human behavior in cyberspace. 
These censorship policies, together with other regulations 
and monitoring techniques imposed by the government, have 
created a situation where some end users in China are inevita-
bly using the Internet in ways consistent with the Chinese gov-
ernment’s planned agenda. According to a 2005 study conduct-
ed by the Chinese Academy of Social Science, most Chinese 
Internet users look for entertainment, rather than political dis-
cussions, on the Internet.144 Several recent research projects 
have reached similar conclusions: regarding their Internet hab-
its, most Chinese netizens are more interested in online enter-
tainment than acquiring political information.145 Even most 
university students who are aware of technologies such as 
proxy servers that enable circumvention of Internet filtering 
are not interested in taking advantage of these technologies to 
reach blocked foreign websites.146 For those Chinese youths 
who are technologically savvy enough to access blocked web-
sites, such circumventions of censorship are frequently just a 
game in which political interest plays a peripheral role.147 The 
above phenomenon echoes one of Lessig’s arguments: we cannot 
reasonably conclude that effective control of code is impossible 
only because complete control or perfect control does not ex-
ist.148 Although Internet filtering does not enable perfect con-
                                                          
 144. MacKinnon, supra note 81, at 33; see YANG, supra note 14, at, 28-31; 
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Scotton, supra note 10, at 32 (introducing the China Internet Network Infor-
mation Center’s research finding that young Chinese Internet users have little 
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ments); Wang & Hong, supra note 46, at 75–77 (finding that political interest 
is absent in the Chinese blogosphere); see also Scotton, supra note 10, at 26 
(attributing the Chinese blogosphere’s declining interest in political issues to 
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 146. MacKinnon, supra note 81, at 33; see also Scotton, supra note 10, at 31 
(introducing Benjamin Bates’ research on the ease of circumventing Internet 
filtering in China via proxy servers). 
 147. Wacker, supra note 17, at 72. 
 148. See generally, CODE VERSION 2.0, supra note 18, at 59–60 (noting that 
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trol over online information flows, it is an essential and effec-
tive policy tool for the Chinese government. By shaping citi-
zens’ online behavior via Internet architecture, the Chinese 
government has slowed down the Internet’s role as a tool for 
political change149 and, thus, has reinforced the Chinese gov-
ernment’s political authority.150 
Nonetheless, it would be naïve to jump to the conclusion 
that Internet filtering and other government measures com-
pletely eliminate subversive online content. Although some re-
searchers believe that the Internet filtering together with strict 
laws has created powerful psychological pressure on Chinese 
netizens,151 many netizens have worked out some ways to avoid 
censorship tools that would otherwise filter out personal politi-
cized online expressions. For instance, it has become quite pop-
ular for Chinese netizens to use homophonies in their online 
expression to circumvent filtering technologies. Here we pro-
vide some representative examples. The pronunciation of river 
crab in Chinese is he xie, which is similar to that of harmony. 
Therefore, Chinese netizens use river crab in place of harmony 
when they are mocking the government’s use of Internet filter-
ing to create a harmonious society.152 Another popular term 
used by Chinese netizens is “grass-mud horse,” the pronuncia-
tion of which is cao ni ma, a near homophone of “fuck your 
mother” in Chinese.153 It has been reported that the Chinese for 
                                                          
the “unregulability of the Internet was a product of design: that the failure of 
that network to identify who someone is, what they’re doing, and where 
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but difficult . . . .”). 
 149. See MacKinnon, supra note 81, at 34. 
 150. In making this argument, we do not mean that Chinese citizens in the 
People’s Republic of China are not interested in engaging in online political 
discussions. We only wish to point out that many of them might be losing in-
terest in finding sensitive political information online. 
 151. Shyu, supra note 32, at 227; see also Lloyd, supra note 40, at 305 
(“[T]he [Chinese] government also relies heavily on self-censorship resulting 
from the public’s fear of possible punishment”). 
 152. See, e.g., HONGMEI LI, PARODY AND RESISTANCE ON THE CHINESE 
INTERNET, IN ONLINE SOCIETY IN CHINA: CREATING, CELEBRATING, AND 
INSTRUMENTALISING THE ONLINE CARNIVAL 71, 78–79 (David Kurt Herold & 
Peter Marolt eds., 2011); Dong Han, “Use” Is an Anagram of “Sue”: Cultural 
Control, Resistance, and the Role of Copyright in Chinese Cyberspace, 7 
GLOBAL MEDIA & COMM. 97, 108 (2011); Qiang, supra note 10, at 210; Tang & 
Yang, supra note 136, at 680; Michael Wines, A Mythical Beast (A Dirty Pun) 
Tweaks China’s Web Censors, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2009, at A1. 
 153. See Scotton, supra note 10, at 41; Tang & Yang, supra note 7, at 679–
80. 
4 LEE LIU FINAL_JAD (DO NOT DELETE) 2/27/2012 1:25 PM 
148 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 13:1 
 
 
grass-mud horse is now filtered in China because “the issue has 
been elevated to a political level.”154 Other popular homophones 
in China include du cai (meaning “poisonous jackal,” a homo-
phone of “dictator” or “dictatorship”) and min zhu (meaning 
“talking pig,” a homophone of “democracy”).155 In most cases, 
homophony will not cause comprehension problems, but it is 
very difficult for the government to ban all the homophonic 
keywords because the Chinese language is abundant in homo-
phones. 
Obviously, in the short run, the Internet’s role in enabling 
a public discourse around political and policy debates in China 
has been limited because of governmental control. The filtering 
technologies have prevented rich online information from flow-
ing into the country. Nevertheless, the Internet has become an 
essential part of many peoples’ lives and has dramatically 
changed the way they communicate. Therefore, it is quite diffi-
cult to assess whether Internet filtering in the long run can re-
ally shape citizens’ behavior according to the government’s 
preference. 
4. Regulating the Intermediaries 
As mentioned above, the Chinese government implemented 
its Internet-filtering strategy primarily in the international 
gateway at the level of IAPs, IXPs, and ISPs. This practice pro-
vides a good example of how government can regulate a decen-
tralized Internet architecture. Because of the open and decen-
tralized nature of the Internet, it is extremely difficult and 
costly to directly regulate each Internet user’s behavior. Profes-
sor Lessig has argued that it is more difficult to regulate scat-
tered individuals than to regulate a few large firms in cyber-
space.156 As a result, it is no surprise that government censors’ 
targeting of intermediaries has become a quite common and ef-
fective alternative for government control in the digital envi-
ronment. 
In the case of online content control in China, it would be 
more effective for the government to indirectly regulate those 
                                                          
 154. Scotton, supra note 10, at 41. 
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BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 759, 764 (2001). 
4 LEE LIU FINAL_JAD (DO NOT DELETE) 2/27/2012 1:25 PM 
2012] FORBIDDEN CITY 149 
users by directly regulating intermediaries like IAPs or IXPs. A 
possible explanation for such indirect regulation is that inter-
mediaries such as IAPs and IXPs are far more susceptible to 
pressures from the government than are individual Internet 
users. Those providers have little choice but to comply with fil-
tering-related regulations and directives imposed by central 
and local governments.157 In summary, it would be much less 
effective for the government to control individual Internet us-
ers’ access to unwanted website than to directly mandate In-
ternet filtering implemented by IAPs or IXPs. 
By the same token, ISPs are also the primary target in the 
Chinese government’s efforts to control content over short mes-
sage services (SMSs).158 Because those ISPs cannot afford to 
disregard the state’s control regime, they have consistently 
abided by their contracts with state-owned telecommunications 
operators and the government’s political imperative.159 The 
Chinese government applies the model of regulating intermedi-
aries to instant-message transmission, as well. China’s most 
popular instant messenger provider QQ received a mandate 
from the government to install keyword-blocking software 
whose basic function is to monitor users’ online activities.160 
The Chinese government’s placement of strict controls on 
search engines is another example of the government’s regula-
tion of intermediaries.161 Because search engines have become 
the major tool for Internet users’ information exploration, regu-
lating search engines directly would be much more efficient and 
effective than regulating the behavior of individual users. In 
addition to regulating code, the Chinese government uses the 
law to control human behavior.162 Among these regulations, the 
major laws to regulate online content impose significant obliga-
tions on ISPs as well.163 These regulations prohibit ISPs from 
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displaying any online content not approved by the govern-
ment.164 As Jack Goldsmith and Tim Wu argue, “when govern-
ment practices control through code, it is practicing a common-
place form of intermediary control.”165 
Regulating content via intermediaries is not uncommon in 
other countries, which may have different ways of filtering 
online content. For example, in Australia, the Australian 
Communications and Media Authority (ACMA) has the power 
to issue a take-down notice to ISPs once the ACMA identifies 
prohibited or potentially prohibited content.166 If such content 
is hosted abroad, the ACMA will filter it out by adding it to the 
blacklist via another intermediary.167 Certainly, regulating in-
termediaries is not new in Internet law. Because ISPs are es-
sential points of control in the flow of online information, they 
have become obvious and appropriate targets for government 
regulation.168 
Professor Seth F. Kreimer wrote that the Internet “is a 
target-rich environment [for governments because it] . . . in-
volves a series of electronic links; at each link, from user to 
originating computer to server to ISP to Internet backbone and 
back down the chain to the end user . . . .”169 Because each 
country has its own ISPs that provide Internet access to indi-
vidual users, governments naturally target ISPs for law-
enforcement purposes. As a result, policymakers in different 
countries may impose different obligations on their local ISPs 
according to each country’s unique set of general values and 
policy goals. These differences in obligations mean that the 
global Internet will be increasingly fragmented. In this sense, 
the Internet is local rather than global, especially when filter-
ing or censorship is concerned. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The Internet may have the power to eliminate sovereign 
boundaries in certain scenarios, but this openness does not 
mean that the Internet exists in a social and political vacuum. 
Conventional wisdom would have us believe that the Internet 
provides anyone with perfect access to information. However, 
this assumption turns out to be patently false in many coun-
tries that implement Internet-filtering systems. Like many 
other countries around the world, China filters Internet content 
that the government deems too sensitive for ordinary citizens. 
And it has done so with precision and effectiveness. 
As China has stripped away much of the openness at-
tributable to the Internet on Chinese soil, commentators’ claim 
that the Internet will democratize the country has become obso-
lete. In fact, the Internet in China has endowed certain types of 
government control with political significance. In this Article, it 
is found that the development of Internet filtering in China ver-
ifies Lawrence Lessig’s code-is-law theory. A code-based regula-
tion, like Internet filtering, is not as transparent as the law. 
Moreover, from the government’s perspective, regulating by 
code may occasionally incur costs that are much lower than 
those involved in regulating by law. This is notably true in the 
Chinese context of regulating the flow of online information. 
The unusual history of the Chinese Internet has made it 
unique and effective in filtering online information. Like Saudi 
Arabia, China designed its Internet architecture early on in the 
public’s use of the Internet, the aim being to control and block 
information flows from abroad. As a result, China has been 
able to filter or block information much more effectively and ef-
ficiently than those countries with traditional open and decen-
tralized networks. Together with other surveillance mecha-
nisms, Internet filtering has, to a certain degree, shaped 
Chinese citizens’ online behavior according to the government’s 
preferences. Nonetheless, because of the dynamic nature of the 
Internet and of information in general, it is difficult to assess at 
this moment whether Internet filtering can always be an effec-
tive tool for government control over the online information. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
